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INTRODUCTION

Enacted on July 26, 1990, the Americans With Disabilities Act
("ADA") 1 is a vide-ranging law that creates new rights, and extends existing rights, for the estimated 43 million Americans who
have a "disability." 2 The ADA prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment (Title I), governmental programs and services (Title II), public accommodations and services
(hotels, restaurants, retail stores, service establishments and other
public facilities) (Title III), and telecommunications (Title IV).
The ADA charges the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") with issuing regulations to carry out Title I.3 On
July 26, 1991, the EEOC issued regulations, together with an Interpretive Guidance Appendix to the regulations to set forth the
4
EEOC's view on issues arising under the ADA.

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990). The bulk of the legislative history of
the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) appears in several congressional
reports: the House Labor Committee Report, H.R. REP. No. 485,101st Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 2 (1990); House Judiciary Committee Report, H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3 (1990); the Senate Report, S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990); and the Conference Report, H.R. REP No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990).
2. The ADA uses the term "disability" instead of the term 'handicap,"
wich is the term found in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796
(1990), and in state handicap discrimination statutes. The legislative history explains that "disability" is the "most current terminology" and "reflects the preference of persons with disabilities." H.R. REP No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
3, at 26-27 (1990); see also S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1990); H.R.
REP No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 50-51 (1990).
3. The EEOC was given until July 26, 1991 to promulgate its regulations.
42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1990). Proposed regulations were issued February 28, 1991, 56
Fed. Reg. 8577 (proposed Feb. 28, 1991) which were finalized July 26, 1991, 56
Fed. Reg. 35,725 (1991).
4. The regulations will be published as Part 1630 of Volume 29 of the Code
of Federal Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1-.16. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,725 (1991). The
regulations have attached to them an Interpretive Gidance Appendix (heremafter referred to as "Interpretive Appendix"). Recordkeepmg requirement reg-
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For employers, the heart of the ADA is its requirement that
the employer make reasonable accommodations,which are not an
undue hardship,so that any qualified individual with a disability
can perform the essential functions of a job. While these terms
may seem simple, the reasonable accommodation requirement can
impose a tremendous financial burden on a business, and employers
will often not know what is "enough." Many employers will have
to revise their hiring procedures and work assignment practices in
order to comply with the ADA, or face an onslaught of litigation for
back pay, reinstatement, attorney fees, and possibly also compensatory damages and punitive damages to be determined by a jury.5
The burdens inposed by the ADA can potentially range from the
expense of hirng a reader for a blind lawyer to restructuring job
assignments so that a disabled employee can perform a tailor-made
job.
II.
A.

COVERAGE

Employers Covered

After a two year waiting period, as of July 26, 1992, the ADA
will cover all employers who employ 25 or more employees. After
will expand to
two additional years, as of July 26, 1994, the coverage
6
all employers who employ 15 or more persons.
Some employers are, of course, already covered by state and
local handicap discrimination laws. Federal contractors, recipients
of federal funds, and federal agencies are presently regulated by the
federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The ADA, however, goes much
further than these statutes in its requirements and its remedies.
Thus, compliance under the present laws does not assure compliance with the ADA.
B. Employees And Applicants Covered
The ADA forbids employment "discrimination" against any
"qualified individual with a disability." The coverage of the ADA is
thus keyed to the definition of "disability." A disability is (1) any
physical or mental smpavrment that substantially limits a ma3or
life activity (e.g., communications, ambulation, working), (2) having
a record of such an impairment, or (3) being regarded by others as
7
having such an impairment.
ulations were also issued, requning that records be retained for one year. 56
Fed. Reg. 35,753 (1991).
5. See Section IX, rnfra.
6. ADA §§ 101(5), 108, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(5), 12118 (1990).
7. ADA § 3(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12103(2) (1990). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1991).
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The legislative history indicates that courts interpreting the
ADA should generally follow the regulations and precedent under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The regulations state that unless
otherwise provided, the ADA does not apply a lesser standard than
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.8 Under the Rehabilitation Act, and
similarly worded state handicap discrimnation statutes, courts have
broadly defined the concept of "disability" to include: epilepsy, 9
cardiovascular disease,10 former drug use,1 ' psychiatric problems, 12
legal blindness, 13 manic depressive syndrome,14 ankylosmg spondylitis, which causes stiffening of the joints, 15 nervous and heart conditions,1 6 multiple sclerosis, 17 blindness in one eye,' 8 a heart
condition, 19 osteoarthritis of the knee jomts,20 cerebral palsy and
dyslexia, 21 right leg amputation, 22 and unusual sensitivity to tobacco smoke. 23 The legislative history of the ADA makes clear that
Congress also meant "disability" to include such additional conditions as muscular dystrophy, infection with the AIDS virus (HIV),
mental retardation, alcoholism, and emotional illness.24
Indeed, the concept of a disability is so broad that Congress
took pains to ensure that certain controversial conditions, which arguably could qualify as disabilities, are not intended to be protected.
Thus, Congress expressly provided that the concept of "disability"
excludes homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestism, transsexualism,
pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, sexual behavior disorders,
compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, and "psychiatric
substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of
drugs."25
8. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c) (1991).
9. Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F Supp. 1130 (D.C.
Iowa 1984).
10. Bey v. Bolger, 540 F Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
11. Davis v. Bucher, 451 F Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
12. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
13. Norcoss v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1985).
14. Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1985).
15. Sisson v. Helms, 751 F.2d 991 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 846 (1985).
16. Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473 (11th Cir. 1983).
17. Pushkin v. Regents of the Umv. of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir.
1981).
18. Holly v. City of Naperville, 603 F Supp. 220 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
19. Bento v. I.T.O. Corp., 599 F Supp. 731 (D.R.I. 1984).
20. Gumn v. Bolger, 598 F Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1984).
21. Fitzgerald v. Green Area Ed. Agency, 589 F Supp. 1130 (S.D. Iowa
1984).
22. Longoria v. Harris, 554 F Supp. 102 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
23. Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F Supp. 85 (D.D.C. 1982).
24. H.R. REP No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 51 (1990).
25. ADA § 511, 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (1990). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3 (1991).
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Congress was particularly clear about the use- of illegal drugs:
nothing in the ADA is meant to "encourage, prohibit, or authorize"
the use of drug tests for the "illegal use of drugs by job applicants or
employees or making employment decisions based on such test re'
sults,"26 and a person who currently uses illegal drugs is not considered an individual with a disability. 27
The regulations make clear that in determining whether a condition affects a major life activity, and hence is a disability, the effect of the condition on the worker is compared to what activities an
"average person in the general population" can 'engage in without
the condition. 28 The condition is to be considered, however, "without regard to mitigating measures such as medicine, or assistive, or
prosthetic devices. '29 The regulations and Interpretive Appendix
indicate that even a temporary condition, if severe enough, can
qualify as a disability, although pregnancy is explicitly excluded as
a disability.3 0 Conversely, the Interpretive Appendix clarifies that
"physical characteristics such as eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or height, weight or muscle tone that are within 'normal'
range and are not the result of a physiological disorder" are not disabilities, nor can "personality traits such as poor judgment or a
quick temper where these are not symptoms of a mental or psychological disorder" qualify as a disability.31 Obesity will normally not
32
be considered to be a disability.
Of particular significance, the regulations dispel the fear that
the definition of a disability is self-defining. There was some concern that if an employer rejects an applicant due to a condition,
then the condition limits the ability to work and thus, by definition,
is a disability. The regulations and Interpretive Appendix make
clear that rejection for a single job does not equate to substantially
limiting the ability to work. Rather, to be a disability with respect
to the limiting work test, the condition must restrict the applicant
from "either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes. '3 3 As examples, the Appendix notes that a commercial air26. ADA § 105(d), 42 U.S.C. § 12114(d)'(1990).
27. ADA § 510(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12210(a) (1990). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3 (1991).
A former illegal drug user does not lose the protection of the ADA, however, if
he is completing or has completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program,
and he is not currently using illegal drugs. 29 C.F.R. § 1639.3(b) (1991). The
term "currently" means more than just the day m question, and includes "recently." Interpretive Appendix, § 1630.3(b), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,746 (1991).
28. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1991).
29. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.2(h), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,740 (1991).
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii) (1991); Interpretive Appendix § 1630.2(h), (j),
56 Fed. Reg. 35,741 (1991).
31. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.2(h), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,741 (1991).
32. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.2(j), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,741 (1991).
33. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(j)(3)(i) (1991).
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line pilot with a minor vision impairment does not have a disability
if he can still be a co-pilot or fly for a courier service. Conversely, a
laborer with a bad back which prevents him from performing heavy
labor jobs would be considered as a person with a disability.34
An employer generally cannot argue that while it rejected a
worker due to a condition for a job, other employers m the same
business might hire the worker despite the condition. If even one
employer rejects an applicant because of "myths, fears and stereotypes," then that person is regarded as a person with a disability and
is protected by the ADA. 35 In addition, the fact that the employer's
judgment is wrong or mistaken does not save the employer. Thus,
even though a person with high blood pressure can perform strenuous labor, if the employer nistakenly assumes that such a worker
cannot perform such work, then the worker will be considered disabled. The same is true if the employer mistakenly believes a person has AIDS.

36

C. Overview Of Employment Prohibitions
The ADA alms to eliminate all job standards and employment
criteria that unnecessarily screen out individuals with disabilities,
and the ADA imposes on employers an affirmative duty to make
reasonable accommodations to disabled applicants and employees,
unless the accommodations would be an undue hardship. A separate-but-equal accommodation is not acceptable.
The ADA seeks to accomplish these purposes by identifying a
number of prohibited employment practices that the ADA defines
as "discrimination" against the disabled:
conducting medical examinations or asking about disabilities before

making the individual an offer of employment;
usmgjob standardsor methods that have the effect of discriminating or
that perpetuate discrimination on the basis of disability;
using qualificationstandards,employment tests, or otherselection cm-

terta that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability, unless the criterion is "job-related" and "consistent with business
necessity";
failing to use tests in the most effective manner to ensure that results
accurately reflect the abilities of an individual rather then his or her
disability, unless the test is intended to measure the individual's
npairnents;
limiting,segregating,or classifying an individual because of his or her
disability in a way that adversely affects job opportunities or status;
34. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.2(j), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,742 (1991).
35. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.2(1), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,743 (1991).
36. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.2(1), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,742 (1991).
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discriminating against a qualified individual (who himself may or may
not be disabled) because that individual has a "relationshipor association with an zndiv-dual with a disability,such as a spouse;"
not making reasonable accommodation to the known disability of a
qualified individual, unless the accommodation would create an undue
hardship on the operation of the business; and
participating in a collective bargainingagreement or other arrangement that has the effect of discrminating against a qualified individual
with a disability.37
It is unlawful for an employer to engage in any of these forms
of discrimination.
III.

MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS AND INQUIRIES

The ADA starts at the first hurdle which most disabled job applicants face in the employment process: the medical examination
and inquiry, including any psychological testing.38 Many employers
use pre-employment screening and medical examinations that have
the effect of rejecting disabled applicants, often without an applicant knowing the basis for the rejection. The ADA reforms these
practices. It forbids an employer, before making a job offer, to
"conduct a medical examination or make inquiries of a job applicant
as to whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or as
to the nature or severity of such disability." 39 On the other hand,
to ensure that employers may continue to rely on certain pre-employment drug screens, the ADA provides that "a test to determine
the illegal use of drugs shall not be considered a medical
40
examinmation."
Similarly, many job applications routinely ask if applicants
have any physical handicap'that may prevent them from performing their job. The ADA will also change this practice. Employers
may inquire as to an applicant's ability to perform "job-related
functions," but the question cannot be phrased in terms of a medical
37. ADA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1990) (emphasis added).
38. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 46 (1990).
39. ADA § 102(c)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2)(A) (1990). See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.13(a) (1991). An employer can ask applicants to voluntarilyidentify any
disability m order to meet the affirmative action requirement of the Rehabilitation Act. Interpretative Appendix § 1630.13(a); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,750 (1991).
The Interpretive Appendix strangely provides that a physical agility test is
not a medical examination. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.14(a), 56 Fed. Reg.
35,750 (1991). This leads to the questions of whether strength testing, a procedure which is becoming more common, is a medical examination, and where
one crosses the line to a "medical examination."
40. ADA § 104(d), 42 U.S.C. § 12114(d) (1990). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(c)(1)
(1991). With respect to the effect of the Drug-Free Workplace Act, see 29
C.F.R. § 1630.16(b) (1991). If the employer misreads a drug test as being positive, when it is negative, the employer will be held liable. There is no good faith
defense. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(b)(3) (1991).

The John Marshall Law Revw[

[Vol. 24:693

condition or a disability. The Interpretive Appendix and the legislative history use the same example of a motor vehicle driver. The
employer may ask whether the driver has a driver's license, but
may not inquire as to his visual ability:
Employers may ask questions whwh relate to the ability to performjobrel&ted functions. However, these questions should not be phrased in
terms of disability. An employer, for example, may ask whether the
but may not
applicant has a drver's license, if driving is a job function,
41
ask whether the applicant has a vzsual disability.

In terms of an allowed job-related function inquiry, an employer can ask all applicants how they believe they can perform the
job. Moreover, even if the question is not routinely asked, if an applicant has an obvious disability which would appear to prevent the
applicant from performing the job, the employer can ask the applicant to explain how he believes he can perform the job.
Thus, the ADA prohibits "medical examinations and inquiries"
prior to the making of a tentative job offer, 42 although it permits an
"employment entrance examination," on which the offer of employment may be conditioned. 43 Any such post-tentative job offer
medical examination, however, must meet certain requirements:
(1) it must apply to all applicants for a particular class of jobs, (2)
the results must be treated as a confidential medical record, including being kept in a separate file and not used for any purpose inconsistent with the ADA, and (3) all parts of the examination which
exclude a worker, i.e., all "exclusionary criteria," must be "job-related and consistent with business necessity."44
The employer may include in its medical criteria any requirement imposed by federal, state, or local law and may conduct any
examinations required by law. This includes Department of Transportation requirements for truck drivers, as well as examinations
41. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.13(a), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,750 (1991); S. REP
No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1990) (emphasis added). The Interpretive Appendix explicitly provides that the question of whether the applicant has ever
had a workers' compensation injury or claim is "in terms of a disability," and
thus can only be asked after a tentative job offer has been made. Interpretive
Appendix § 1630.12(a), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,750 (1991).
42. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.14(a), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,750 (1991).
43. ADA § 102(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c) (1990). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13(a)
(1991). This prohibition does not extend to screening for illegal drugs. See
supra text accompanying note 26.
44. ADA §§ 102(c)(3), (4)(A), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12212(c)(3), (4)(A) (1990). See 29
C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) (1991). "The legislation allows covered entities to require
post-offer medical examinations so long as they are gzven to all entering emFor example, an entity can test all police
ployees in a particularcategory.
officers rather than all city employees or all construction workers rather than
all construction company employees." S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 39
(1990) (emphasis added). In terms of confidentiality, the records can be used in
admimstering .aworkers' compensation program, as well as health insurance.
Interpretive Appendix § 1630.14(b), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,751 (1991).
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required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA"). 45 However, any state or local law which is inconsistent
with the purpose of the ADA, i.e., the requirement is not job-re46
lated and of business necessity, may be preempted by the ADA.
In addition, an employment entrance examination "may be used to
obtain baseline data to assist the employer in measuring physical

changes attributable to on-the-job exposures." 47
The ADA thus allows inquiry into a worker's medical condition, once a tentative job offer is made. If an applicant is rejected
because of that individual's medical examination, however, the individual will be aware of that fact and will be able to challenge the
determination. Employers will thus have to tailor their medical examination criteria to relate to the physical requirements of the essential functions of the job in question. If the applicant is rejected
because of a condition that would not prevent him from performing
the essential functions of the job, with reasonable accommodations,
the employer will be held liable for a violation of the ADA.
For current employees, a mandatory medical examination is
permitted only if it can be shown to be "job-related and consistent
with business necessity. ' 48 Within certain limits, voluntary medical
49
exammatins are allowed without such a showing.
45. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.16(b)(5)(6), 1630.16(c)(2) (1991); H.R. REP. No. 485,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 46 (1990) (emphasis added). See also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.15(e) (1991) (conflicts with other federal laws).
46. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.1(a), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,740 (1991). See also
29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e) (1991). The legislative history provides that "The committee does not intend for this Act to override any medical standards or requirements established by Federal, State or local law as a prerequisite for
performing a particular job, if the medical standardsare conststentwith section
504 - that zs, if they arejob-relatedand conszstent with business necessity. See,
e.g., Strathie v. Dep't of Transp., 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983). For example, several health standards promulgated pursuant to the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 655) and the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969 and the amendments thereto adopted in 1977 (30 U.S.C. 801 et seq.)
require that employees exposed to certain toxic and hazardous substances be
medically surveyed at specified intervals to determine if the exposure to those
substances have had any negative effect on the employees." H.R. REP No. 485,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 74 (1990) (emphasis added).
47. H.R. REP No. 485,101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 74 (1990). See also znfra
notes 68-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of safety considerations.
48. ADA § 102(c)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12113(c)(4)(A) (1990). See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.14(c) (1991). For example, a "fit to return to duty examination" after an
injury or illness would probably be proper. On the other hand, if a gay employee was missing a lot of time from work, that would not justify an AIDS test.
Interpretive Appendix §§ 1630.13(a), (b), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,750, 35,751 (1991).
49. ADA § 102(c)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 12113(c)(4)(B) (1990). See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.14(d) (1991).
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EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS

The ADA is primarily directed at employment standards, e.g.,
job requirements which unnecessarily exclude a disabled person
from a job. In evaluating such standards, the employer must first
identify the essential functions of the job. The employer then must
ensure that any employment standard that might exclude a disabled person is related to the essential functions of the job. The
employer must next determine if a reasonable accommodation
would permit the disabled person to meet the employment standards and thus perform the essential functions of the job. The legislative history sums up this three-part requirement as follows:
The three pivotal provisions to assure a fit between job criteria and

an [individual's] actual ability to do the job are:
(1) The requirement that persons with disabilities not be disqualified because of the inability to perform non-essential or marginal
functions of the 3ob;
(2) The requirement that any selection criteria that screen out or

tend to screen out be 3ob related and consistent wzth business necessity; and
(3) The requirement to provide reasonable accommodation to assist persons with disabilities to meet legitimate criteria. 5 0
Each of these three mandates has a number of potential pitfalls
for employers, who must carefully examine and meet each requirement for each disabled person.
A.

EssentialFunctions Of The Job

The qualified individual with a disability "is an individual who
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires."5' The identification of what are the essential functions
of a job is key to assuring compliance with the ADA. Medical criteria and standard/test criteria must be keyed to the essential functions of the job. Similarly, an employer under the alLimportant job
restructuring accommodation requirement need restructure only
non-essential functions of the job. Nevertheless, the ADA itself
does not define "essential functions." The legislative history is no
more helpful: it defines "essential" as duties which are "fundamental and not marginal."5 2
The ADA provides that "consideration shall be given to the
employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and
if an employer has prepared a written [job] description before ad50. S.REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1990) (emphasis added).
51. ADA § 101(8), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1990). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)
(1991).
52. S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1990) (emphasis added).

1991]

An Employer's Guzde To The ADA

vertismg or interviewing applicants for the job, this description
53
shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.
While any previously created written job descriptions will be considered evidence of the essential functions of a job, the worker will
be free to challenge the accuracy of the descriptions. 54 Thus, employers will want to have written job descriptions of the physical
requirements for a position in place before any claim is filed. Moreover, employers must recognize the need for industrial engineering
support for such descriptions since the job descriptions will be open
to challenge.
The essential functions of the job are not all the job duties for a
position. Thus, for example, one court held that 88% of a welder's
assignments constituted the essential functions of the job and thus
the welder's inability to perform the remaining 12% of the job tasks
was no defense to a discrimination claim. 55
Moreover, as reflected by the legislative history, if, only some
employees in a work group need an ability, e.g., to drive a car in an
emergency, then that function may not be essential.5 6 Furthermore, in evaluating an individual's capabilities, the employer can
only consider the worker's current conditions. The "mere possibility of future incapacity does not by itself render the person not
57
qualified."
The regulations provide some guidance in applying the defimtion of "essential functions" to the practicalities of the real world.
The regulations offer three examples of reasons why a job function
may be considered essential: (i) the position exists to perform that
53. ADA § 101(8), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1990). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)
(1991).
54. An amendment that would have created a presumption in favor of
This
the employer's determination of essential functions was rejected.
additional language adopted by the Committee is not meant to change the
current burden of proof. This language simply assures that the employer's
determination of essential functions is considered. A plaintiff may challenge the employer's determznation of what s an essentialfunction.
H.R. REP No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 33-34 (1990) (emphasis added).
55. Ackerman v. Western Elec. Co., 643 F Supp. 836 (N.D. Calif. 1986).
56. H.R. REP No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 33 (1990).
57. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1990). "The determination of
whether a person is qualified should be made at the time of the employment
action, e.g., hinng or promotion, and should not be based on the possibility that
the employee or applicant will become incapacitatedand unqualified in the
future. Nor can paternalistic concerns about what is best for the person with a
disability serve to foreclose employment opportunities." H.R. REP No. 485,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 34 (1990). The employer cannot specualte as to
future incapacitation. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.2(m), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,743
(1991). On the other hand, if it is known (as opposed to a mere possibility) that
the applicant will have to miss work in the next three months due to his condition, and even with reasonable accommodations, the worker's job requires that
he must be at work every day for the next three months, then he need not be
hired. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.14(b), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,751 (1991).

The John MarshalZ Law Review

[Vol. 24:693

function, (ii) "the limited number" of employees available to perform the function, and (iii) the function is so "highly specialized"
that the incumbent in the position is hired to perform it.58 The regulations then identify seven of the categories of evidence that may
help determine whether a particular function is essential: (i) the
employer's judgment, (ii) written job descriptions prepared before
job advertising or interviews, (iii) the amount of time spent on the
job performing the function, (iv) the consequences of not requiring
the incumbent to perform the function, (v) the collective bargaining
agreement, (vi) the work experience of past incumbents in the job,
and (vii) the current work experience of incumbents in "similar
jobs."59
The Interpretive Appendix notes that these examples and categories of evidence are not exhaustive and will not be given greater
weight than evidence which is not on these lists. The Interpretive
Appendix also notes that the small size of a workforce, and a "cycle
60
of heavy demand for labor intensive work" will be considered.
The Interpretive Appendix observes that the employer's reasoned
judgment regarding production standards will not be questioned
and nit-picked, provided the production standard is not a subterfuge
for intentional discrimination:
It is important to note that the inquiry into essential functions is not
sntended to second guess an employer's business3udgment wZth regard

to productionstandards,whether qualitative or quantitative, nor to require employers to lower such standards. [See section 1630.10 Qualification Standards, Tests and Other Selection Criteria]. If an employer
requires its typists to be able to type 75 words per minute, it will not be
called upon to explain why a typing speed of 65 words per minute
would not be adequate. Similarly, if a hotel requires its service workers to clean 16 rooms a day, it will not have to explain why
6 1 it chose a 16
room requirement rather than a 10 room requirement.

The employer must show, however, "that it actually imposes
such requirements on its employees in fact, and not simply on paper." 62 This is a key requirement. An employer's judgment that all
its welders must be able to lift 50 pounds will not be questioned,
58. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2) (1991).
59. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (1991). The Interpretive Appendix stresses that
an "individual assessment" of the job is needed: "analyzing the actual job duties

and determining the true purpose or object of the job." Interpretive Appendix

§ 1630.9, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,749 (1991).
60. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.2(n), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,743 (1991).
61. Id. (emphasis added). The Interpretive Appendix notes that "if it is alleged that the employer intentionally selected the particular level of production
to exclude individuals with disabilities, the employer may have to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its selection" Id. at 35,744. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.15(b)(c) (1991) (disparate treatment and impact). See also Interpretive
Appendix § 1630.10, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,749 (1991) ("production standards will generally not be subject to a challenge under [Section 1630.10].").
62. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.2(n), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,744 (1991).
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only if all welders on the job are, in fact, lifting 50 pounds as part of
their job. If an applicant can show that several current welders for
the employer have never lifted over 25 pounds on the job, then the
50 pound requirement will not be upheld.
Because courts will look closely at what really are the essential
functions of a job, employers will need good industrial engineering
back-up to justify most job duty requirements. Of critical import,
the written job duty requirements must match the abilities of the
current workforce. The applicant's current abilities, with reasonable accommodations, will then be measured in terms of the job's
essential functions.
B.
1.

Use Of Objective Screensng Crrtera

QualificationAnd Testing Requirements

If an employer's job qualification requirement tends to screen
out disabled persons, then the ADA requires the employer to prove
that the requirement is "job related for the position in question and
is consistent with business necessity. '63 Under established employment discrimnation law, the job-related and business necessity
standard is one of the more difficult requirements to meet.
Similarly, the ADA forbids tests that do not accurately reflect
the disabled individual's skill, aptitude, or other factors which the
tests purport to measure. 64 Authority under the Rehabilitation Act
similarly prohibits employers from utilizing discriminatory testing
procedures. In one case, it was held to be unlawful for an employer
to deny an equipment operator job to a dyslexic applicant simply
because he could not pass a written test to enter the training program for the job. Since the dyslexia would not interfere with the
operation of the equipment itself, ie., the job duties, it was an map65
propriate screening criterion.
The regulations and Interpretive Appendix appear to recognize
some exceptions to this requirement. A smoke-free workplace is
explicitly permitted, and the Interpretive Appendix provides that
66
leave policies generally need not be justified.
The lesson for employers is clear: if a standard, criterion or
test excludes a disabled person from a job, then the employer will
63. ADA § 102(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (1990). See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.10(a) (1991). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(c) (1991) (disparate treatment and impact).
64. ADA § 102(b)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(7) (1990). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.11
(1991).
65. Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666, 669 (11th Cir. 1983). See Interpretive
Appendix § 1630.11, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,749 (1991).
66. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(d) (1991). See Interpretive Appendix § 1630.15(b)(c),
56 Fed. Reg. 35,752 (1991).
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have to justify the need for the standard, criterion or test, and
demonstrate that it excludes only those persons who can not perform the essential functions of the job, even with reasonable
accommodations.
2. Safety Standards
Employers have an obvious interest m insisting that a worker
be able to safely perform his job. The ADA and its regulations require, however, that a safety risk can be considered only if there is
"a significant risk of substantial harm . . based on a reasonable
medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowland that the
edge and/or on the best available objective evidence.
risk cannot be eliminated or reduced by a reasonable accommodation." 67 The Interpretive Appendix indicates that a substantial risk
68
requires a '"high probability."
a. Protecting Safety Of Others
An employer may defend against a charge of disability discrimination on the basis that an individual's disability poses a "ssgnzfcant rsk to the health and safety of others. '6 9 However, as the
Supreme Court made clear m School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline,70 safety and health risks may not be judged based on unfounded fears, or even the views of an individual physician. Rather,
courts will look to the opinions of public health officials.
In Arline, the Supreme Court, interpreting the Rehabilitation
Act, considered the health and safety risk from a contagious disease
tuberculosis. The Court indicated that it would follow the approach urged by the American Medical Association in its amicus
brief, weighing the risk and dangers from the disease, as well as the
probability of transmission:
[Findings of] facts, based on reasonable medical judgments given the
state of medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk (how the
disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is the
carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential
harm to third parties), and (d) the probabilities the
7 1 disease will be
transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm.
67. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1991). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10(b) (1991). The
worker's ability to safely perform the job must be based on his current condition, and not on speculation as to is future incapacitation. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.3(m), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,743 (1991).
68. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.2(r), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,745 (1991).
69. ADA §§ 101(3), 103(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(3), 12113 (1990). See 29 C.F.R.
1630.10(b) (1991).
70. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
71. Id. at 288.
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The Arline Court also stated that judges should "defer to the
judgments of public health officials in determining whether an mdividual is otherwise qualified unless those judgments are medically
unsupportable." 72 The Court was unsure whether courts could also
credit "the reasonable medical judgments of private physicians on
73
which an employer has relied."
The legislative history of the ADA explicitly accepts the Arline
precedent:
The employer must identify the specific risk that the individual with a
disability would pose. The standard to be used in detdiminng whether
there is a direct threat is whether the person poses a signifwant risk to
the safety of others or to property,not a speculative or remote risk, and
that no reasonable accommodation is available that can remove the

risk. (See section 102(b) of the legislation). See also School Board of
Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). For people with mental
disabilities, the employer must identify the specific behavior on the

part of the individual that would pose the anticipated direct threat.
Making such a determination requires a fact-specific -individualized
inquiry resulting in a "well-rnformed.7udgmentgrounded in
a careful
74
and open-minded wezghzng of the risks and alternatives."

Consistent with this explanation, in determining what constitutes a
significant risk, the conferees intend that the employer may take into
consideration such factors as the magnitude, severity, or likelihood of
risk to other individuals -n the workplace and that the burden would
be on the employer to show the relevance of such factors in relying on
the qualification standard.7s

Thus, in evaluating a health or safety risk to others, employers
should be prepared to demonstrate, with an objective medical opinion, which is not mconsistent with the opinions of public health officials such as the Surgeon General or the Center for Disease
Control, that a worker represents a significant risk to the health or
safety of others. At a minimum, the regulations require that the
employer produce evidence of the "current medical knowledge
and/or the best available objective evidence" which substantiates

76
the significant risk.

72. Id. at 286-87 n.15.
73. Id. at 288 n.18.
74. S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1990) (emphasis added), citing
Hall v. United States Postal Service, 857 F.2d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir. 1988), quoting
Arline. See also Mantolete v. Bolger, 757 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) and Stratl-e
v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983).
75. H.R. REP No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1990) (emphasis added).
76. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1991). Special rules apply to food handlers with
infections and communicable diseases designated by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services. 20 C.F.R. 1630.16(e) (1991). The Secretary designated fifteen viruses and bacteria, e.g., salmonella typl, but not the AIDS HIV virus. 56
Fed. Reg. 40,897 (1991).
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b. Safety Of The Disabled Individual
A question raised by the language of the ADA is the extent to
which employers can deny employment opportunities on the basis
of fears about the disabled individual's own safety. While the ADA
expressly permits consideration of a direct threat "to the health or
safety of others,"77 conspicuous by its absence is any reference to
the worker's own safety.
The legislative history suggests a concern over an employer's
"paternalistic concerns for the disabled person's own safety."7 8 The
House Report addresses in some detail the limits on an employer's
ability to exclude a disabled individual on the basis of danger to
himself, suggesting that exclusion may be appropriate only where
the disability poses a "high probability of substantial harm" or an
"imnnnent substantial threat of harm:"
A candidate, undergoing a post-offer, pre-employment medical exanimation may not be excluded, for example, solely on the basis of an
abnormality on an x-ray. However, if the examining physician found
that there was high probability of substantial harm if the candidate
performed the particular functions of the job in question, the employer
could reject the candidate, unless the employer could make a reasonable accommodation to the candidate's condition that would avert such
harm and such accommodation would not cause an undue hardship.
However, the Committee would like to stress three important
points. First, the assessment that there exists a high probability of
substantialharm must be strictly based on valid medical analyses. For
example, back x-rays which reveal anomalies in asymptomatic persons
Therefore, employers
usually have largely low predictive value.
should be diligent m assuring that their examining physicians make
assessments based on testing measures that actually and reliably predict the substantial,imminent degree of harm required.

Third, employment decisions must not be based on paternalistic
views about what is best for a person with a disability. Paternalismis
perhaps the most pervasiveform of discmminationfor people with disabilitiesand has been a ma3or barrierto such indimnduals. A physical

or mental employment criterion can be used to disqualify a person
with a disability only if it has a direct impact on the ability of the person to do their actual job duties without imminent, substantial threat
of harm. Generalized fear about risks from the employment environbe
ment, such as exacerbation of the disability caused by stress, cannot
used by an employer to disqualify a person with a disability.79
Remarks on the House and Senate floors further emphasized that
in any case in which a company considers the individual's own
77.
78.
79.
added)
1982)).

ADA § 101(3); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (1990) (emphasis added).
S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1990).
H.R. REP No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 73-74 (1990) (emphasis
(citing Bentivenga v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 623 (9th Cir.
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health or safety, the individual should be consulted.8 0
Given the legislative history, as well as the requirement of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act s ' that an employer provide a
safe workplace, it seems clear that an employer may consider the
worker's own safety. Indeed, the regulations adopt this viewpoint
and allow an employer to consider the workers' own safety in the
same manner the employer considers the safety of others. Thus,
if current medical knowledge and the best available objective evidence demonstrates a significant risk of substantial harm to the
worker himself, he need not be hired unless the risk can be elinnnated or reduced to an acceptable level by reasonable
accommodations. 8 2
C. The Need ForAn Individualized, Case-By-Case Approach
Employers prefer to develop employment criteria and procedures that can be applied in a uniform manner. The legislative history to the ADA, however, makes clear that each qualified
individual with a disability must be treated with an sndivmdualized
approach that does not result in segregation of the disabled and is
free of stereotyping and generalizations:
Section 102(b)(1) of the legislation specifies that the term "discrmination"Includes limiting, segregating,or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or
status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such
applicant or employee.
Thus, covered entities are required to make employment decisions
based on facts applicable to individual applicants or employees, and
not on the basis of presumptions as to what a class of individuals with

disabilities can or cannot do.
For example, it would be a volation of this legislation if an employer were to limit the duties of an individual with a disability based
80. 136 CONG. REC. H4626 (July 12, 1990) (remarks of Rep. Waxman); 136
CONG. REc. S9697 (July 13, 1990) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) (an employer
should not refuse to hire a person with AIDS because the work would expose

the employee to additional health risks).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1990).
82. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(r), 1630.10(b) (1991). The Interpretive Appendix
provides the following example, indicating the definition of a substantial risk is
a high probability of harm:
If performing the particular functions of a job would result in a high
probability of substantial harm to the individual, the employer could reject
or discharge the individual unless a reasonable accommodation that would
not cause an undue hardship would avert the harm. For example, an employer would not be required to hire an individual, disabled by narcolepsy,
who frequently and unexpectedly loses consciousness for a carpentry job
the essential functions of which require the use of power saws and other
dangerous equipment, where no accommodation exists that will reduce or
eliminate the risk.
Interpretive Appendix § 1630.2(r), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,745 (1991).
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on a presumption of what was best for such zndivzdual or based on a
presumption about the ability of that individual to perform certain
tasks. Similarly, it would be a violation for an employer to adopt separate lines of progression for employees with disabilities based on a presumption that no individual with a disability would be interested in
moving into a particular job.
It would also be a violation to deny employment to an applicant
based on generalized fears about the safety of the applicant or higher
rates of absenteeism. By definition, such fears are based on averages
and group-based predictions. This legislation requires zndivdualized
assessments which are incompatible with such
an approach. Moreover,
83
even group-based fears may be erroneous.
For large employers who hire in significant numbers, this approach will be difficult to implement. One possibility is to have an
ADA review officer, much like the medical review officer who
plays an important role in drug testing procedures. Applicants can
go through a standardized process, but before an applicant is rejected due to a disability, the ADA review officer can review the
applicant's individual case. Such an approach combines the efficiency of a standardized system with the flexibility the ADA
requires.
V

DISCRIMINATION ON BASIS OF ASSOCIATION

While the main thrust of the ADA is to eliminate unintentional
and unnecessary barriers to employment of qualified individuals
with disabilities, the ADA also resembles traditional employment
discrimination laws in forbidding intentional discrimination based
on prejudice. Employers covered by the ADA will be absolutely
forbidden to reject a disabled applicant based on prejudice against
disabled persons, just as they are forbidden to rely upon the individual's race, sex, national origin, or religion in denying employment.
The ADA goes one step further than traditional employment
law in tins respect by also expressly forbidding discrimiation on
the basis of an individual's association: the ADA -forbids an employer to rely on a person's "relationship or association with a disabled individual. '8 4 The historical origin of this provision was a
concern that employers might discriminate against persons who,
while not themselves disabled, care for or live with individuals who
are disabled, particularly persons with AIDS.8 5 This provision applies to many situations, such as an employee who has a child with
Down's Syndrome. Indeed, the association need not be with a fain83. S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 28 (1990) (emphasis added). See also Interpretive Appendix § 1630.9, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,747-49 (1991).
84. ADA § 102(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (1990). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.8
(1991) (the relationship may be family, business, social or other).
85. H.R. REP No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 39 (1990).
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ily member.
In these cases, the employer is forbidden to discriminate
against an employee or applicant on the basis that the individual
has a relationship with a person with a disability. For purposes of
this provision, it is irrelevant, of course, whether the disabled individual is qualified for any particular job. By the same token, the
employer has no duty to provide any reasonable accommodation to
non-disabled persons sinply because they are associated with a person who is disabled

87

VI. THE DUTY TO PROVIDE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS
The ADA uses the concept of employment "discrimination" in
such a way as to impose affirmative obligations on employers.
Thus, an employer is liable for "discrimination" not only if it acts
on the basis of a prejudice against individuals with disabilities, but
also if the employer fails to make reasonable accommodations.
Thus, the ADA defines discrimination to include:
(A) not making reasonableaccommodationsto the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified indivdual unth a
disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered

(B)

eral
1.
2.
3.

entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardshzp on the operation of the business of such covered
entity; or
denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee
who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such
demal is based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of
the employee or applicant.88

In an effort to clarify this requirement, the ADA spells out sevexamples of possible reasonable accommodations:
"making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities,"
"acquisition or modification of eqtupment or devices,"
"the provision of qualified readers or interpreters,"

86. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 61-62 (1990) (applies to
any association and is not limited to family members).
87. The regulations thus do not speak in terms of reasonable accommodation, but simply forbid an employer to "exclude or otherwise deny equal jobs or
benefits to a qualified individual" because of the "known disability" of the
other, related, individual. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.8 (1991). This regulation is well-supported in the legislative history:
In contrast, assume that the-employer hires the applicant. If he or she violates a neutral employer policy concerning the attendance or tardiness, he
or she may be dismissed even if the reason for the absence or tardiness is to
care for the [disabled] spouse. The employer need not provide any accommodation to the non-disabled employee.
S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1990).
88. ADA § 102(b)(5), 42 U.S.C. §'12112(h)(5) (1990). See also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.9 (1991) (emphasis added).
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"appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, traiung
materials or policies,"
"part-time or modified work schedules,"
"job restructuring,"
"reassignment to a vacant position," and
a catch-all -' 89 "other sinilar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities."

The statutory list of possible reasonable accommodations is
merely a guide, not an exhaustive list. The ADA requires a "factspecific case-by-case approach." 90 The flexibility required by this
approach means that the employer may sometimes not know "what
is enough," even when the accommodations are very expensive (e.g.,
providing a reader) or require totally revising the approach to the
work itself (e.g., job restructuring).
A.
1.

Methods Of Reasonable Accommodations

Making FacilitiesAccessible

One of the standard means of accommodating the disabled is to
make a facility physically accessible to the worker with a disability.
Often a worker can perform the duties of a job, but he can not get to
the work location. Whether the need is for a wheelchair ramp, a
specially equipped bathroom, a closer parking spot, or possibly even
the installation of an elevator, an employer must install such facilities if they are reasonable and not an undue hardship. 91 Moreover,
as noted below, the undue hardship standard under Title I of the
ADA is more difficult for an employer to meet than the "not-readily-acluevable" test imposed on public facilities under Title III of
the ADA. Thus, a facility modification that is not required to ac89. ADA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1990). See also 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(o)(2) (1991). The order of reasonable accommodations listed in the statute has been rearranged to conform to the order of discussion in this article.
90. The legislative history states:
The term "reasonable accommodation" is defined in section 101(8) of the
legislation. The definition includes illustrations of accommodations that
may be required in appropriate circumstances. The list is not meant to be
exhaustive; rather, it is intended to provide general guidance about the nature of the obligation. Furthermore, the list is not meant to suggest that
employers must follow all of the actions listed in each particular case.
Rather, the decision as to what reasonable accommodation is appropriate is
one which must be determined based on the particular facts of the mdividual case. This fact-specific case-by-case approach to providing reasonable
accommodations is generally consistent with interpretations of this phrase
under sections 501, 503, and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1990) (emphasis added).
91. The duty to accommodate, however, is not limited to the employee's
work station. The duty to accomodate includes all the benefits and privileges of
employment. Interpretive Appendix §§ 1630.2(o), 1630.9, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,744,
35,748 (1991). Thus, the duty includes making accessible a company cafeteria or
employee lounge. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.9, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,747 (1991).
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commodate the public under Title III might nonetheless be required under Title I to accommodate a disabled worker.
2. Adaptive Hardware
For many employees, reasonable accommodation can be
achieved with little cost in the form of adaptive hardware. Indeed,
such an accommodation is a natural corollary to making facilities
physically accessible. Examples cited in the legislative history include: (1) a $49.95 telephone headset, so that an insurance salesperson with cerebral palsy could write while talking; (2) a $26.95 timer
with indicator light, so that a deaf medical technician could perform
the laboratory tests required for her job; and (3) a $45.00 lightmg
system, so that a visually impaired receptionist could see which tel92
ephone lines were ringing, on hold, or in use.
Other examples of simple and inexpensive devices include (1)
special computer systems, electromc visual aids, talking calculators,
magnifiers, audio recordings, and brailled materials, for visually impaired individuals; (2) telephone handset amplifiers, telephones
compatible with hearing aids, and special telecommumcation devices, for individuals with hearing impairments; and (3) gooseneck
telephone headsets, mechamcal page turners, or raised or lowered
93
furniture, for individuals with limited physical dexterity.
The reasonable accommodation requirement does not, however, include "personal use items such as hearing aids and eyeglasses" unless such items are designed for a particular job. A
reasonable accommodation is thus an adjustment or modification
that "specifically assists the individual in performing the duties of a
particular job," as opposed to an adjustment or modification that
"assists the individual throughout his or her daily activities, on and
off the job."

3.

94

Qualified Readers Or Interpreters

While providing physical facility modifications and adaptive
equipment have been traditional accommodations, often of a low
cost nature, the idea of hiring a reader or interpreter is a relatively
new concept near the cutting edge of the accommodation requirement. Readers and interpreters can be expensive, and may effectively require hiring two persons to perform one job. Yet, under
the ADA, reasonable accommodations may include qualified read92. S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1990).
93. S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1990).
94. S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1990); Interpretive Appendix
§ 1630.9, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,747 (1991).
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ers, interpreters, or even the provision of an attendant during the
workday or for travel:
The legislation also explicitly includes provision of qualified readers or interpreters as examples of reasonable accommodations. As
with readers and interpreters, the provision of an attendant to assista
person wzth a disabilitydumng partsof the workday may be a reasonable accommodation depending on the circumstances of the individual
case. Attendants may, for example, be required for travelingand other
3ob-relatedfunctions. This issue must be dealt with on a case-by-case
basis to determine
whether an undue hardship is created by providing
attendants.9 5
The provision of readers and interpreters shows how far the
reasonable accommodation requirement can go. In a case decided
under the Rehabilitation Act, an employer was required to lure
half-time readers for a blind maintenance worker, because the actual cost of the accommodation to the employer was only a small
percentage of the employer's entire budget.96 When one looks at an
accommodation for one employee in terms of an employer's entire
budget, almost all accommodation requirements are "reasonable"
and not an "undue hardship."
There are limits, of course, as to what an employer can be required to do in the name of a reasonable accommodation. In one
case, a police department declined to assign a "back-up" employee
for a hearing-impaired individual who wanted assistance in performing the job of police dispatcher. The hearing handicap would
have caused the individual to miss 40 percent of the commuications, because of the high frequencies involved. Although a "backup" employee could have listened in and repeated every commumcation to ensure that nothing was missed, this was held not to be a
reasonable accommodation, because it would have supplanted the
need for the individual with a disability, rather than enabling the
97
individual to perform the essential job function in question.
While the provision of readers and interpreters occurs infrequently, the employer who must pick up the tab has a significant
expense. Moreover, this accommodation illustrates how far the
ADA requires the employer to go.
95. S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1990) (emphasis added). See
also Interpretive Appendix § 1630.2(o), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,744 (1991) (personal assistants, travel attendant).
96. Nelson v. Thornburg, 567 F Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d
146 (3d Cir. 1984).
97. DFEH v. City of Anaheim Police Dep't, California FEHC Decision No.
82-08 (1982).
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4. Modification Of ExamrnationsTraimngMaterials Or Policies
As noted above, any employment examination, job criterion,
training materials, or policy that excludes persons with disabilities
must be job-related and a business necessity. Moreover,.even if the
examinations, criteria, standards and policies are so justified, the
employer must attempt, as a reasonable accommodation, to revise
them so that they do not exclude persons with disabilities. That is,
there is a duty to attempt to eliminate exclusionary examinations,
training materials, and policies as a reasonable accommodation.
5. Part-Time Or Modified Work Schedules
What many employers will find most troubling is the way the
ADA can affect how the employer actually performs its work. It is
one thing to require an employer to remove unnecessary barriers to
the employment of persons with disabilities. It is another matter to
tell employers how they must operate their business. For many
employers, particularly in manufacturing industries, it will be difficult for them to understand that the ADA can, actually require
them to change their manufacturing process or method of operation
as an accommodation. One example is the requirement that employers provide part-time or modified work schedules as a reasonable accommodation. Thus, if a worker because of a disability
cannot accept the stress of a full-time job, or must leave work early
to catch a specially equipped bus, a part-time or a'modified work
schedule may be required as a reasonable accommodation. As mvasive as such a requirement may be, even more significant is the
problem presented by the logical next step - job restructuring.
6. Job Restructurng
For employers who engage in manufacturing or construction,
the most difficult reasonable accommodation to understand, and
implement, is-job restructuring. The House and Senate reports define job restructuring in an identical manner:
Job restructuring means modifying a job so that a person with a
disability can perform the essential functions of the position. Barriers
to performance may be eliminated by eliminating nonessential elements; redelegating assgnments; exchangzng assignments with another employee;
and redesignsng procedures for task
98
accomplishment.
For many employers, how they do their work is viewed as their
own business. The government may tell us who we must hire to
98. S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1990); H.R. REP No. 485, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 62 (1990) (emphasis added). See also Interpretive Appendix § 1630.2(o), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,744 (1991) (job restructuring includes "altering when and/or how an essential function is performed").
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build a widget, but we decide how to build it. The ADA changes
this. Now, as a reasonable accommodation, an employer must consider redelegating assignments and redesigning work procedures so
that a person with a disability can perform the essential functions of
a job.
Of particular concern is the requirement of "exchanging assignments with another employee," which arguably mandates job swapping. Thus, an employer may be required to develop a system of
reassignmng work so that disabled persons can be assigned to light
duty jobs, even if this means trading jobs with a healthy person.
While the exact reach of this requirement is unclear, it does not,
however, require job bumping, %.e.,placing another employee out of
work:
The committee also wishes to make clear that reassignment need
only be to a vacant position - "bumping" anotheremployee out of a
position to create a vacancy is not required.99

For many plant managers, the concept of job restructuring is
foreign. Employers naturally prefer able-bodied workers who can
move from assignment to assignment. Job restructuring undermines this flexibility, and instead, requires employers to tailor a job
to the worker.
The Interpretive Appendix does indicate an important limit on
job restructuring. While the employer can be required to reallocate
the marginal and peripheral job duties, the employer is not required to reallocate essential job functions:
An employer or other covered entity is not required to reallocate
essential functions. The essential functions are by definition those that
the individual who holds the job would have to perform, with or without reasonable accommodation, in order to be considered qualified for
the position. For example, suppose a security guard position requires
the individual who holds the job to inspect identification cards. An employer would not have to provide an individual who is legally blind
with an assistant to look at the identification cards for the legally blind
employee. In this situation the assistant would be performing the job
for the individual with a disability rather than assisting the individual
to perform the job. See Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533 (10th Cir.
1979).100
A fitting end note to job restructuring and work reassignments
is also considered a possible reasonable
accommodation, although paid leave is excluded as such.10 1 Thus,
reasonable accommodation without undue hardship may include a
is the fact that unpaid leave

99. S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1990) (emphasis added); see also

H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 63 (1990).

100. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.2(o), 56 Fed. Reg. 35, 744 (1991).
101. H.R. REP No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 63 (1990); S. REP No.
116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 63 (1990); Interpretive Appendix § 1630.2(o),
56 Fed. Reg. 35,744 (1991).
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duty to cover for an ill employee when the inconvemence of doing
so is not greater than that of covering the absences of other
10 2
employees.
7

Reassignment To A Vacant Position

Sometimes an incumbent employee, because of a disability, can
no longer perform the essential functions of a job, even with reasonable accommodations. In that case, the ADA would permit an employer to remove the employee from the job, but would require the
employer to transfer the employee to any vacant job for which the
employee is qualified. An employer must first, however, try to accommodate a worker in his current job, before transferring him to a
vacant position:
Efforts should be made
to accommodate an employee in the
position that he or she was hired to fill before reassignment is
considered.' 03
The employer need not, however, displace any other worker to
accommodate the disabled employee; the reassignment need only
be to a vacant position. The ADA thus does not create "bumping"
rights.' 0 4 Nor does the ADA require that an individual be promoted to fill a vacant position, or that they be paid while the search
for a vacant position is made. 0 5 It does, however, require giving the
disabled current employee the first crack at a job opening, if no reasonable accommodation would permit the employee to perform his
current job.
Reassignment is not a reasonable accommodation required for
applicants, as opposed to current employees.' 0 6 Of course, as a
practical matter, this merely puts the burden on the applicant to
find appropriate job vacancies. If he applies for the vacancy, the
ADA requirements apply to his application.
8. Other Accommodations
The list of reasonable accommodations in the ADA is expressly
non-exhaustive. Anything which enables a disabled worker to be
able to perform the essential functions of a job must be considered.
For example, courts have held that other possible accommodations
102. See DFEH v. Kingburg Cotton Oil Co., California FEHC Decision No.
84-30 (1984).
103. S. REP NO. 116, 101st ConQ., 2d Sess. 32 (1990). See also H.R. REP No.
485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 63 (1990). The effort to locate a vacant position need only be made for a reasonable time. Interpretive Appendix
§ 1630.2(o), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,744 (1991).
104. Id.
105. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.2(o), 56 Fed. Reg 35,744 (1991).
106. Id., S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1990).
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include seating rearrangements, 10 7 and the Interpretive Appendix
states that personal assistants, employer-provided transportation or
reserved parking may be a reasonable accommodation. 0 8s The only
limitation is the imagination of the disabled person and his
attorney.
B. ProcedureAnd Employee Input
The reasonable accommodation requirement can impose a significant burden on employers, and the legislative history makes
clear that employers' adherence to the ADA and implementation of
appropriate procedural safeguards will be closely monitored.
The legislative history and Interpretive Appendix recommend
that employers follow a step-by-step approach towards meeting the
reasonable accommodation requirement. The employer first must
notify the applicant or worker that the employer has a duty to provide reasonable accommodations. 10 9 The employer then should
await a request for an accommodation.
The employer then needs to accommodate a disability only to
the extent that the employer is aware of the disability. Moreover,
even if so aware, the employer should normally not offer an accommodation, but rather should wait until the disabled individual requests one:
IThe legislation clearly states that employers are obligated to
make reasonable accommodations only to the "known" physical or
mental limitations of a qualified individual with a disability. Thus, the
duty to accommodate s generally triggered by a request from an employee or applicantfor employment. Of course, if a person with a
known disability is having difficulty performing his or her job, it would
be permissible for the employer to discuss the possibility of a reasonable accommodation with an employee.
In the absenceof a request, it would be snapproprateto provide an
accommodation, especially where it could inpact adversely on the individual. For example, it would be unlawful to transfer unilaterally a
as a teacher to a job where such
person with HIV infection from a job
110
person has no contact with people.
107. See, e.g., DFEH v. Fresno County, California FEHC Decision No. 84-22
(1984) (employer required to permit non-smoker sensitive to smoke to sit apart
from smokers in office); Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1989) (easilydistracted employee could have been reasonably accommodated by transferring
him to job that separated him from co-workers).
108. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.2(o), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,744 (1991).
109. ADA § 104,42 U.S.C. § 12114 (1990). See S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 33 (1990).
110. S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1990) (emphasis added) (citing
Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988)). See H.R. REP.
No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 39 (1990) ("the employer is not liable for
failing to provide an accommodation if it was not requested"). See also Interpretive Appendix § 1630.9, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,748 (1991).
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Of course, if a-person with a disability is having problems performmg his job, the employer "may inquire whether the employee is m
need of a reasonable accommodation."' 111 An employer may also
ask for documentation, presumably a doctor's note, establishing the
need for an accommodation. 112
In considering possible accommodations, it is very important
that the employer obtain the thoughts of the individual involved:
The Committee suggests that, after a request for an accommodation has been made, employers first will consult with and involve the
zndimdual with a disability in deciding on the appropriateaccommo-

dation. The Committee recognizes that people with disabilities may
have a lifetime of experience identifying ways to accomplish tasks differently in many different circumstances. Frequently, therefore, the
person with a disability will know exactly what accommodation he or
she will need to perform successfully in a particular.7ob. And, just as

frequently, the employee or applicant's suggested accommodation is
simpler and less expensive than the accommodation the employer
might have devised, resulting in the employer
and the employee mutu1 13
ally benefiting from the consultation.
The Interpretive Appendix suggests a four step "problem solving approach":
1) analyze the particular job involved and determine its purpose and
essential functions;
2) consult with the individual with a disability to ascertain the precise
job-related limitations imposed by the individual's disability and
how those limitations could be overcome with ,a reasonable
accommodation;
3) in consultation with the individual to be accommodated, identify
potential accommodations and assess the effectiveness each would
have in enabling the individual to perform the essential functions
of the position; and
4) consider the preference of the individual to be accommodated and
select and implement the accommodation 114
that is most appropriate
for both the employee and the employer.
The regulations refer to an "informal, interactive process with the
qualified individual with a disability.""15 The Interpretive Appendix refers to an example of a dolly or hand truck being provided to a
worker with a bad back who could lift fifty pound sacks but could
116
not carry them the required distance.
The employer ultimately must decide whether a possible accommodation is reasonable. In addition to the ADA statutory ex111.
112.
113.
114.

Interpretive Appendix § 1630.9, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,748 (1991).
Interpretive Appendix § 1630.9, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,748 (1991).
S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1990) (emphasis added).
Interpretive Appendix § 1630.9, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,748 (1991). See also S.

REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1990).
115. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (1991).

116. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.9, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,749 (1991).
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amples, cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act will indicate
what accommodations are considered reasonable. For instance, one
employer had to accommodate an epileptic nursing assistant with
seizure disorders by either providing additional supervision and giving blood tests to ensure that he remained under proper medication
or by placing him in a clerical position.1"7 There are, however, limits to the accommodation that an employer must provide. One
court rejected the demand of a mail-sorting machine operator with
strabismus (cross-eyes) that his employer eliminate an essential
function of his job by attempting an impractical modification of machnery. 118 Nor was an employer forced to create a new position or
designate other workers to perform a disabled individual's essential
duties in order to accommodate an employee who had a heart and
nervous condition.'1 9
If an employer can identify more than one effective accommodation, the legislative history gives mixed signals as to how a choice
is to be made. On the one hand, "the employer may choose the accommodation that is less expensive or easier"; on the other hand,
the employee's choice is to be given "primary consideration." 20
While the Interpretive Appendix is not clear on this point, it appears to give the "ultimate discretion" to the employer.121
In this respect, Title VII law on religious accommodation may
provide some guidance. In one case, the court rejected a flight attendant's claim that the employer's flexible scheduling system was
not a reasonable accommodation to her religious need to observe
Saturday as the Sabbath. The court held that any reasonable accommodation is enough.122 The employer was not required to accept the employee's proposed alternative scheduling plans or to
prove that each of the employee's proposed alternatives would have
unposed an undue hardship.
C. The Role Of Collective Bargaznzng Agreements
The ADA permits some consideration of collective bargaining
agreements in determining what is a reasonable accommodation.
Provisions of a collective bargaining agreement cannot, however,
117. Smith v. Admin. of Veterans Affairs, 32 F.E.P 986 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
118. Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985).
119. Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473 (11th Cir. 1983).
120. S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1990) (emphasis added). H.R.
Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 66-67 (1990). If the employee refuses an accommodation, then he may be considered as no longer being disabled. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.9(d), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,749 (1991).
121. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.9, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,748-49 (1991) (also mdicating the "best" accomodation is not necessary).
122. Hudson v. Western Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 261,266 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing
Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 40 (1986)).
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justify an employer to do what the ADA forbids: 2 3
[tfhe collective bargainingagreement could be relevant . in determznng whether a gzven accommodation ss reasonable. For example, if a collective bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for
employees with a given amount of seniority, it may be considered as a
factor m determining whether it is a reasonable accommodation to assign an employee with a disability without seniority to that job.
In other situations, the relevant question would be whether the collective bargazningagreement articulateslegitimate business critera.
For example, if the collective bargaining agreement includes job duties, it may be taken into account as a factor in determining whether a
given task is an essential function of the job.124
The exact role of a collective bargaining agreement is uncertain. The regulations and Interpretive Appendix provide that the
collective bargaining agreement can be considered in determining
what are the essential functions of a job and what is a disruptive
force and, thus, a potential undue hardship. 125 Conversely, for any
agreement negotiated after the ADA's effective date of July 26,
1992, Congress expects that the agreement will explicitly authorize
the employer to take any action needed to comply with the ADA:
Conflicts between provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
and an employer's duty to provide reasonable accommodations may be
avoided by ensuringthat agreementsnegotiated after the effective date
of thzs title contain a provson permztting the employer to take all
actions necessary to comply with this legislation.26 "
Thus, for collective bargaining agreements entered into after
July 26, 1992, it is unclear to what extent provisions in the agreements can be considered m determining the essential functions of
the job and what is a disruptive force2 7
123. The legislative history makes plain that reliance on a collective bargaining agreement will not automatically avoid liability:
An employer cannot use a collective bargaining agreement to accomplish
what it otherwise would be prohibited from doing under this legislation.
For example, a collective bargaining agreement that contained physical criteria which caused a disparate impact on individuals with disabilities and
ware not job-related and consistent with business necessity could be challenged under this legislation.
S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1990). See also H.R. REP No. 485,101st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 63 (1990).
124. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1990) (emphasis added). See
also H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 63 (1990).
125. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(v) (1991). See Interpretive Appendix § 1630.15
(d), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,752 (1991).
126. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1990) (emphasis added). See
also H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 63 (1990).
127. The limitation on contracts and other arrangements is not limited to
collective bargaining agreements. It applies to any contract which has the effect
of discriminating against an employer's applicants or employees. Interpretive
Appendix § 1630.6, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,746-47 (1991).
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UNDUE HARDSHIP

A reasonable accommodation is not required if it would impose
an "undue hardship" on the employer. Read superficially, this language might allay concerns about the reasonable accommodation
requirement. In practice, however, the undue hardship defense is
one most employers in most circumstances will not be able to meet.
Moreover, an employer will never know that it qualifies for the defense until the court rules, for there is no "safe harbor." 128 As such,
this defense may be of limited value.
The ADA provides the following definition of undue hardship:
(A) IN GENERAL - The term "undue hardship"means an action
requrimg significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of
the factors set forth m subparagraph (B).
(B) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED - In determining whether
an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include (i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this
Act;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the
number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses
and resources, or the mpact otherwise of such accommodationupon
the operation of the facility;
(iii)
the overallfinanczal resourcesof the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number
of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, meluding the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of
such entityr; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered
entity .'
The regulations add a fifth factor to be considered - the disruption to the other workers and the production process:
(v) The impact of the accommodation upon the operation of the
site, including the impact on the ability of other employees to perform
130
their duties and the impact on the site's ability to conduct busmess.
This addition is important because it recognizes the practical realities of the workforce and the importance of avoiding disruptive
128. Proposed amendments to the ADA would have provided that costs in
excess of 10% percent of an individual's salary would constitute an undue hardslup as a matter of law. These amendments were defeated. H.R. REP No. 485,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3., at 41 (1990).
129. ADA § 101(10), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1990) (emphasis added). The regulations provide that in determining the cost, one must consider the net cost,
"taking into consideration the availability of tax credits and deductions, and/or
outside financing." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(i) (1991).
130. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v) (1991). However, an adverse effect on morale
is insufficient to meet the disruptive undue hardship test. Interpretive Appendix § 1630.15(d), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,752 (1991).
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forces. 1 3 1

Under the foregoing standards, it will be difficult for any large
employer to show that any one accommodation truly imposes an
"undue hardship" unless the accommodation is extreme. It is clear,
moreover, that substantial cost alone will not necessarily constitute
an undue hardstnp. The legislative history explicitly denies any
precedential value to the holding in TWA v. Hardison,L3 2 rendered
in the context of religious accommodation under Title VII, that anything more than a de mznimis cost is an undue hardship.'L3
The undue hardship defense is also much harder for an employer to meet than the defense, under Title III,, that a physical
modification in public accommodation is not "readily achievable":
The ADA defines "undue hardship" in Section 101(10)(A) to mean
an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered
in light of the factors set forth in subsection (B). This definition was
included for two reasons. First, a definition of undue hardshnp was included in order to distinguish it from the definition of "readily achievable" in title III governing the requirement to alter existing public
accommodations. Readily achzevable means "easily accomplishable
and able to be carred out without much difficulty or expense." The
duty to provide reasonable accommodation, by contrast, is a much
higher standard than the duty to remove barriers in existing buildings
(if removing the barriers is readily achievable) and creates a more sub131. Two examples in the Interpretive Appendix reflect the disruptive force
factor. The first provides:
For example, suppose an individual with a disabling visual impairment that
makes it extremely difficult to see m dim lighting applies for a position as a
waiter in a nightclub and requests that the club be brightly lit as a reasonable accommodation. Although the individual may be able to perform the
job in bright lighting, the nightclub will probably be able to demonstrate
that that particular accommodation, though inexpensive, would impose an
undue hardship if the bright lighting would destroy the ambience of the
nightclub and/or make it difficult for the customers to see the stage show.
Interpretive Appendix § 1630.2(p), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,744-45 (1991). The second
example provided for in the Interpretive Appendix provides:
Alternatively,_for example, an employer could demonstrate that the provision of a particular accommodation would be unduly disruptive to its other
employees or to the functioning of its business. The terms of a collective
bargaining agreement may be relevant to this determination. By way of
illustration, an employer would likely be able to show undue hardship if
the employer could show that the requested accommodation of the upward
adjustment of the business' thermostat would result in it becoming unduly
hot for its other employees, or for its patrons or customers. The employer
would thus not have to provide this accommodation. However, if there
were an alternate accommodation that would not result in undue hardship,
the employer would have to provide that accommodation. It should be
noted, moreover, that the employer would not be able to show undue hardship if the disruption to its employees was the result of those employees'
fears or prejudices toward the individual's disability and not the result of
the provision of the accommodation.
Interpretive Appendix § 1630.15(d), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,752 (1991).
132. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
133. S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1990).
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134

The legislative history on "undue hardship" further emphasizes the difficulty of showing undue hardship by favorably citing a
court decision that rejected an "undue hardship" defense on the basis that the large sums of money involved were only a "small fraction of the [entity's] budget." 135 Creating still further difficulties
for an employer who would seek to show that an accommodation
creates an undue hardship is the legislative history to the effect that
if a reasonable accommodation potentially would benefit more than
one disabled person, e.g., a wheelchair ramp, then that fact reduces
136
the impact of the employer's undue hardship argument.
As if all this were not enough, whenever an employer can
prove an undue hardship, the individual with a disability must be
permitted to supply or pay for the accommodation to the extent
that the undue hardship can then be eliminated.137 Thus, an employer will be hard pressed to know where to draw the line, and
how to approach the disabled person concerning his option to contribute. Congress has declined to provide any safe harbor m this
area, other than to acknowledge that the ADA does not require ac38
commodations that would cause closure of a plant or bankruptcy.
VIII.

HEALTH BENEFiTs

The ADA covers discrimination with regard to "terms, conditions and privileges of employment," including health benefits. The
ADA, however, also has a "safe harbor" provision which states that
Title I shall not be construed to restrict normal insurance law as to
underwriting risks. Thus, the ADA does not prohibit or restrict:
134. H.R. REP No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 40 (1990) (emphasis
added).
135. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 41 (1990). Accord Interpretive Appendix § 1630.15(d), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,752 (1991).
136. H.R. REP No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 69 (1990).
137. S.REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36 (1990).
138. The Committee is responding particularly to concerns about employers who operate in depressed or rural areas and are operating at the margin
or at a loss. Specifically, concern was expressed that an employer may elect
to close a store if it is losing money or only marginally profitable rather
than undertake significant investments to make reasonable accommodations to employees with disabilities. The Committee does not intend for the
requirements of the Act to result in the closure of neighborhood stores or
in loss of jobs. The Committee intends for courts to consider, in determming 'undue hardshnp,' whether the local store is threatened with closure by
the parent company or is faced with job loss as a result of the requirements
of this Act.
H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 40-41 (1990) (emphasis added).
But see sd. at 40 (parent corporation's assets, and its relationship to subsidiary,
can be considered).
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(1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company, health maintenance organization, or any agent or entity that administers benefit
plans, or similar organizations from underwriting risks, classifying
risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent
with State law; or
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide
benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with
State law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide
139
benefit plan that is not subject to State laws that regulate insurance.
The legislative history cites examples of health insurance practices that are forbidden and permissible under the ADA. First, it
would be unlawful to deny insurance coverage to an employee on
account of disability, but an employer may limit coverage for certain procedures or treatments, even though that would affect disSecond,
abled persons more than non-disabled persons. 40
employers may continue to use insurance policy clauses that exclude pre-existing conditions, so long as these clauses are not used
as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADA.141
Because the ADA will require employers to hire persons with
pre-existmg conditions who previously might not have been bred,
employers should consider expanding their pre-existing exclusion
provision in their health, life, and disability insurance plans. Of
course, if the exclusions go too far, they may be considered to be a
subterfuge. Thus, a reasoned, balanced provision should be
139. ADA § 501(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (1990). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(f)
(1991).
140. [E]mployers may not deny health insurance coverage completely to
an individual based on the person's diagnosis or disability. For example,
while it is permissible for an employer to offer insurance policies that limit
coverage for certain procedures or treatments, e.g., only a-specified amount
per yearfor mental health coverage, a person who has a mental health condition may not be denied coverage for other conditions such as for a broken
leg or for heart surgery because of the existence of the mental health condition. A limitation may be placed on reunbursements for a procedure or the
types of drugs or procedures covered e.g., a limit on the number of x-rays or
non-coverage of expermental drugs or procedures; but, that limitation
must apply to persons with or without disabilities. All people with disabilities must have equal access to the health insurance coverage that is provided by the employer to all employees.
S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1990) (emphasis added).
141. The ADA does not, however, affect pre-existing condition clauses included in insurance policzes offered by employers. Thus, employers may
continue to offer policies that contain pre-existing condition exclusions,
even though such exclusions adversely affect people with disabilities, so
long as such clauses are not used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
this legislation.
S. REP No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1990) (emphasis added). See also Interpretive Appendix § 1630.5, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,746 (1991).
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adopted. One possibility is an 18-month exclusion, which would be
co-extensive with the applicant's right to continue his health insurance from Is prior employer for 18 months.142
IX.

COMPARISON wiTH CURRENT LAw

Many employers believe that the ADA will not change how
they do business because they already are subject to the Rehabilitation Act (which prohibits handicap discrimination by federal contractors and grantees, as well as federal agencies) or a similar state
handicap discrimination law. It is true that most of the concepts
behind the ADA are borrowed from the Rehabilitation Act and its
regulations. Additionally, the ADA leaves all state handicap discrimination laws in place: it does not supersede any law that provides "greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with
disabilities than are afforded by this Act." 143
There are, however, two critical differences which will make
the ADA as different from the current law as night is from day.
First, as noted above, the ADA explicitly prohibits certain practices,
e.g., pre-offer medical examinations, and spells out certain examples of reasonable accommodations which currently the vast majority of employers do not utilize. Many managers would laugh at the
suggestion that they must provide readers, interpreters, part-tune
work, and modified work schedules. With respect to job restructuring, most managers do not even know what the concept is, let alone
understand its full ramifications. All these accommodations cost
money and reduce efficiency. As such, many businesses will have a
hard time emotionally, as well as economically, accepting them. To
date, for most corporations, compliance with equal opportunity laws
has been rather simple: "what does it matter if the employee is
white, black, or green; male, female, or in between? If the employee can get the job done, equal opportunity hnng costs the company nothing." The ADA is different. In contrast to traditional
discrimination laws, it can impose substantial costs on employers.
The second difference is one of enforcement. It is one thing to
have the federal government enforce handicap discrimination laws
against government contractors. It is another matter to have enforcement initiated by private attorneys who seek compensation for
their clients, and a fee for themselves, against all employers with 15
or more employees. In addition, because medical examinations will
142. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(A) (1990). The applicant's right to continue his
health insurance from his prior employer is pursuant to the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA"). See Consolidated Ommbus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986).
143. ADA § 501(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12501(b) (1990).
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be given after a tentative job offer, rejected applicants will know
they were not hired because of their disability.
Moreover, because the ADA incorporates the remedies of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, amendments to Title VII to provide for
jury trials, compensatory damages for pam and suffering, and pumtive damages will vastly broaden the scope of remedies available
under the ADA. While President Bush successfully vetoed the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990, he did not object to provisions for
jury trials and compensatory damages, and only mildly objected to
punitive damages. Thus, it is possible that Title VII remedies will
be expanded before the effective date of the ADA (July 26, 1992).
Employers covered by the ADA could then face the potential of being sued by disabled individuals before sympathetic jurors who are
free to award virtually any level of damages.
X. COMPLIANCE

Employers must begin now to revise their thought processes in
filling jobs. It is no longer enough to ask whether the company
hires all qualified applicants regardless of race, creed, color, religion, or sex. Rather, employers will have to ensure that they have
an affirmative program for implementing reasonable accommodations so as to allow disabled employees to perform the essential
functions of a job. This may mean reserving light duty work for
disabled persons, allowing part-tune work and modified work
schedules, as well as providing special equipment, readers, and interpreters. An ADA review officer may well be a useful means of
providing the case-by-case approach the ADA requires.
Smart employers will plan ahead and develop programs that
minimize the implementation costs and assure compliance. Hiring
disabled workers may cost more, but that is what the law requires.
The following actions should be part of any compliance program:
A. Once the ADA becomes law, notify employees and applicants of the employer's duties under the Act, including the duty to
provide reasonable accommodations upon requests. Employers
should post notice of these duties, in the same manner as they presently post notice of their responsibilities under various other employment statutes. Such postings will prevent potential plaintiffs
from arguing that the statute of limitations on filing an action
under the ADA has been tolled.
B. Eliminate all pre-offer medical examinations, except any
screening for the use of illegal drugs. Even as to these drug-screening tests, the employer should assure that the only information reported is use of illegal drugs; otherwise the employer may receive
information about legal drug usage that indicates such protected
disabilities as epilepsy or HIV disease.
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C. Ensure that the list of forbidden pre-employment inquiries
includes any questions about disabilities, diseases, prescription
drugs, and workers' compensation claims.
D. Prepare job descriptions, prior to the effective date of the
ADA, that list the physical requirements and other demands for
each job. In doing so, ensure that each requirement directly relates
to essential job functions, with industrial engineering backup
documentation.
E. Confine all pre-employment inquiries concerning vocational abilities to mquiries about the individual's abilities to perform the essential functions of the job in question.
F Do not reject an applicant or dismss a current employee
because of an individual's disability unless: (1) the disability prevents the individual from performing the essential functions of the
job; or (2) the disability means that the individual cannot perform
the job without substantial risk of injury to the individual or others.
G. Even then, do not reject the applicant or dismiss the current employee unless it is also true that no reasonable accommodation will enable the individual to perform the job safely.
H. Base each employment decision on factors other than the
individual's disability.
I. When considering possible reasonable accommodations,
make a written record of the following- (1) all the individual's suggestions as to what accommodations would address the disability in
question; (2) the costs imposed by the accommodations considered
in terms of immediate outlay, disruption, and job efficiency; (3) the
sources the employer consulted, such as other employers in the industry and disability advisory groups; and (4) the options the employer considered.
J. Avoid casting any employment decision involving an mdividual with a disability in terms of the individual's own good or protection. The ADA takes a very dim view of paternalism. Any
rationale stated in terms of the individual's own good must rest on
very strong evidence that the individual's employment would create
a substantial risk to the individual's safety, based on the established
views of public health officials or the medical profession.
K. Along these same lines, never take any adverse decision
concerning an individual with a disability without thoroughly consulting (and documenting) the individual's own thoughts concerning the various options open to the employer.
L. Appomt an ADA review officer to ensure that the employer has at its disposal an experienced and individualized approach to compliance with the ADA for each worker.
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M. To inimie the insurance costs that will accompany a
policy of hiring employees without consideration of disability, consider expanding the pre-existing condition exclusion m company insurance plans.

